eeems to be a characteristic of matter, that all its operations proceed from the action of one substance upon another. Hence it is in its very nature dependent.

Herein is the activity and the independence of spirit distinguished from the passiveness and dependence of matter. "We hold—we cannot but hold—that the principle of cause and effect reigns in mind as in matter. Our intuitive belief ^p causation leads us to this conclusion. It is on account of the existence of sifjRh a connexion that we can anticipate the future in regard to the actions of intelligent and voluntary beings, as well as in regard to changes in material substances. It is upon it that we ground oar confidence in the Character and Word of God. But there is an important difference between the manner in which this principle operates in body and in spirit. In all proper mental operations, the causes and the effects He both within the mind. Mind is a self-acting substance, and hence its activity and independence.

We acknowledge that things, *ab extra,* do operate upon the human mind. In respect, for instance, to the sensations produced by sensible objects, the mind is passive, though even here the existence of the sensation implies a mental capacity belonging to the mind itself.* But in respect of its proper functions, the mind is self-acting.† Changes are produced within the mind by the mind itself. These changes are produced according to mental laws, and which are the rules or principles of the faculties or the attributes of the agent.

We have said that changes are produced in the mind by means of the faculties of the mind. In investigating the operations of the human mind, the difference between their mode of action and that of material substances has not always been kept in view. Hence, in particular, the error that pervades the system of Dr. Thomas Brown, who speaks of all our ideas as mental states, produced by the immediately preceding state, according to the laws of simple and relative suggestions, without taking into account the active and abiding faculties of the soul, which (and not the mere contiguous state) are the main causes of any given mental state. We say the main causes, or rather the main element in any given cause ; for in mind, as in matter, causes have always somewhat of complexity. It is the same quality or power exercised in the same circumstances.

We have seen (B. ii. sect. 1) that in the operation of cause in the material universe, there must be the presence of two or more bodies. We have now said that, in this respect, mind differs essentially from matter. But still there is so far an analogy between the operation of causes in both. In mental, as in material phenomena, there is a certain complexity in the causes. The whole cause of any given mental state is not, as Dr. Brown constantly assumes, the immediately preceding state. When we feel our persons to be in danger, and resolve on adopting steps to avoid the peril, it is not the mere perception of the clanger that is the cause of the succeeding volition. There is most assuredly in the cause, not only the sense of the danger, but, as a more important element, the power of will. When, on

hearing a falsehood told, we feel a strong moral indignation, there is something more in the cause of this indignation than a mere conception of the falsehood; there is a faculty of the mind which leads us to abhor that which is evil. In short, the true cause of any given mental phenomenon, its unconditional antecedent,

* Hence in all action of body on mind, and of mind on body—in all perception, for instance, and muscular movement—there is a *double cause*. There is body and mind in one state followed by the body and mind in another state. This principle followed out may throw some light both on the philosophy of perception and of voluntary motioa

t " Every body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within of itself possesses a soul—such, then, is the very nature of 80ul."—(Plato's Phaedruu.)